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The Long War: insurgency,
counterinsurgency and collapsing
states
MARK T BERGER & DOUGLAS A BORER
ABSTRACT This introductory article provides the context for the contemporary
debate about insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states taking place
against the backdrop of what originated as the ‘global war on terror’ (GWOT)
and is now increasingly being characterised as ‘the Long War’. The Long War
and the GWOT are often represented as a ‘new’ era in warfare and US
geopolitics, despite the fact that, rhetorically, George W Bush and other
administration officials have on occasion invoked the Second World War as
analogous to the Long War. This article argues that the Long War is new in
important respects, but it also bears many similarities to the Cold War. A key
similarity between the Cold War and the Long War is the way in which
insurgency and counterinsurgency are seen primarily in the context of inter-
state rivalry in which the critical local or regional dynamics of revolution and
counter-revolution are neglected. In this context US policy makers and their
allies have again erroneously applied a ‘grand strategy’ that suits the
imperatives of conventional military and geopolitical thinking rather than
engaging with what is a much more variegated array of problems facing the
changing global order. The Long War is ostensibly a war against various non-
state movements, networks and actors, and is even represented as such by the
Pentagon and the White House. However, the overall approach to the Long
War has continued to fall back on the conventional ‘American Way of War’
that produces more problems than it solves.
In February 2003, just before the regime of Saddam Hussein was ousted by
military force, the then US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld (who
resigned in November 2006), spoke publicly about the need to move ‘beyond
nation building’. In echoing domestic political viewpoints on the ‘welfare
debate’ in the USA, the head of the Pentagon argued that the various efforts
at reconstruction in the Balkans, Haiti and elsewhere in the post-cold war era
had produced a ‘culture of dependence’ among Third World countries. He
held out the limited approach to post-conflict reconstruction that the USA
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model for how it would proceed in post-Saddam Iraq. Even as Rumsfeld was
outlining this approach, there were many observers inside and outside the
Pentagon who questioned the wisdom of Washington’s minimalist post-
conflict reconstruction plans in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The Pentagon, in
their view, seemed to be more concerned with persuading the US electorate
that invading Iraq would not lead to a Vietnam-style quagmire than it was
with the vagaries of post-war nation building. Rumsfeld successfully
constrained the role of Colin Powell’s State Department (which had already
generated plans for post-war reconstruction in Iraq), in order to keep the US
‘footprint’ small in Iraq. There was little or no serious preparation for the
possibility of state collapse in the wake of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Senior members of the US military warned that far more troops would be
required to maintain order in Iraq once Saddam had been ousted. However,
they were overruled by their civilian masters and, in a powerful signal to
other potential detractors, the US Army’s Chief, the four-star General Eric
Shinseki, was sacked for publicly deviating from Rumsfeld’s view during the
his testimony before Congress.1
The debate about the profound problems that have afflicted Iraq following
the US invasion in March 2003 (and the earlier overthrow of the Taliban in
Afghanistan) has now produced an ever-growing literature.2 The battle for
Iraq in particular looms over the administration of George W Bush as he
enters his final two years in office.3 Meanwhile, the US occupation of Iraq is
well into its fourth year and the ongoing instability has now carried the
former dictatorship to the brink of, if not already into, a full-blown civil war.
In this context Washington has positioned Iraq as central to the Long War,
displacing or encompassing the global war on terror (GWOT). At the same
time, despite changes within the Bush administration, and despite the
deteriorating situation in Iraq, it remains doubtful whether senior officials are
willing to seriously rethink the way they deal with insurgency, counter-
insurgency, post-conflict reconstruction and nation building in an era of
collapsing states. For example, the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review,
published in February 2006, argued that ‘victory in the long war depends on
strategic communication’. This comment was clarified in a subsequent speech
that suggested, according to a number of informed observers, that the then
Secretary of Defense ‘still seems to think that winning hearts and minds is
just a question of better presentation’ of US intentions and policies, rather
than addressing deeper issues.4 More broadly, as another commentator has
noted, the Quadrennial Defense Review ‘is supposed to represent a bottom-up
effort to rethink America’s defense needs’ to ‘prepare for a new era of fighting
terrorists and insurgents (plus China)’. However, it falls far short of that
goal, and proceeds to set out ‘programs and weapons very much the same as
when the enemy was the Soviet Union’.5
Neither Rumsfeld’s public utterances nor the Quadrennial Defense Review
reflect an effort by the White House or the Pentagon to develop a new
conception of insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states. At this
juncture, like Iraq, a growing number of polities in the Middle East and
beyond have the potential to, or have already, become collapsing states.
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Nevertheless, there is a studied lack of acknowledgement on the part of the
US government that the Long War cannot be fought via conventional
warfare or through a superficial recasting of insurgency and counter-
insurgency. Long before 11 September 2001 and the subsequent invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, the dramatic changes of the post-cold war era had
already suggested there was a need for reframing insurgency and counter-
insurgency specifically, and US foreign policy more generally. With the end
of the Cold War the escalating crisis of the nation-state system was
increasingly apparent as the uneven spread of globalisation took its toll on
fragile states.6 In fact, it needs to be emphasised that the specificity of
insurgency and counterinsurgency (revolution and counter-revolution) were
marginalised by the wider imperatives of US –Soviet rivalry during the Cold
War by mainstream scholars, pundits, and practitioners alike. The need to
rethink US grand strategy generally and the GWOT or the Long War more
specifically, has become even more imperative as the war in Iraq increasingly
contributes to the growing destabilisation of the Middle East and beyond.7
The contributors to this volume on the Long War approach the question
of insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states from a variety of
perspectives. However, they all examine contemporary insurgencies and
counterinsurgencies in various parts of the world in ways that attempt to
shed new light on the history and current predicament of collapsing states. In
this context they also seek to clarify the character and limits of the Long War
now being pursued by the USA. At the outset we address the question as to
what exactly we should understand the term ‘Long War’ to mean. This is
both part of and followed by an attempt to provide the overall historical
background to and contemporary context for US experience with insurgency,
counterinsurgency and nation building in an effort to broaden the parameters
of the current debate.
From the Cold War to the Long War
One of the key characteristics of the post-cold war era, during which the USA
appeared to demonstrate unrivalled global hegemony and military dom-
inance, has been the growing number of collapsing and collapsed states. The
end of the Cold War both contributed, and drew greater attention, to the
increasing number of nation-states mired in civil conflict and/or civil war,
which were increasingly displaying an almost complete absence of political
stability and social order. By 2005 the World Bank had identified 30 ‘low-
income countries under stress’ (LICUSs), including Afghanistan, Angola,
Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Haiti,
Burma, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikstan, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.
Meanwhile, the British government’s Department for International Devel-
opment (DFID) listed almost 50 polities that it regarded as ‘fragile’ states.8
If anything these categorisations are relatively charitable. If a stricter
measure of stability is used, and a serious notion of what the delivery of basic
rights and services to the majority of a nation-state’s citizens entails, the list
of collapsing or failing states increases dramatically.
THE LONG WAR
199
Many failing or failed states had, of course, begun their downward slide
during the Cold War, even if the idea of collapsing or collapsed states had not
yet emerged as the central concern it is today. The Cold War was, as we have
already implied, also a Long War that pitted insurgencies against counter-
insurgencies (revolutionaries against counter-revolutionaries) in the context
of the wider contest between capitalist and state-socialist forms of nation
building and development. However, the primary axis of the Cold War
remained centred on inter-state rivalry rather than addressing the specificities
of revolution and counter-revolution (the local roots of conflict and
instability) in the Americas, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.9 With the
end of the Cold War, and further highlighted by the events of 11 September
2001, conflict and violence in many parts of the world have been driven by a
combination of old and new forms of insurgency/counterinsurgency and
revolution/counter-revolution. At the same time Washington has increasingly
compounded state collapse with its use of military force to punish or
overthrow regimes it perceives as threats to international order and US
national security. For instance, in Iraq some insurgents are fighting to evict
the USA and see their struggle as a war of national liberation against a
foreign occupier. At the same time a second group, primarily foreign fighters,
see Iraq as an important battlefield in the global jihad. Still other Iraqi
insurgents see the primary enemy as the new Iraqi government, with sectarian
cleavages (particularly, but not exclusively, between Sunni and Shi’a)
increasingly coming to the fore.10 This is the context in which the US
military in Iraq is seeking to facilitate the building of a new nation-state that
is acceptable to Washington, to regional actors, both state and non-state in
character, and to the Iraqis themselves. As many of the contributors to this
issue will make clear, the USA and its allies have embarked on a nation-
building and counterinsurgency campaign that has thus far proven to be
unsuccessful in Iraq. This is taking place against the backdrop of a wide
range of far less prominent counterinsurgency nation-building activities from
Afghanistan to the Philippines to Colombia and beyond.
At this juncture the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular are at the
centre of the Long War in a fashion reminiscent of the way in which Vietnam
was at the centre of the Cold War in the erstwhile Third World in the 1960s.
Iraq has emerged as a key proving ground for what we term neo-conservative
nation building.11 Further, the US overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 has
come at a time when the nation-state of Iraq is in crisis (arguably it had been
in crisis since its creation in 1920). More broadly the crisis in Iraq is simply a
major focus of the wider crisis of the UN-centred nation-state system itself.
This is taking place against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War, the
uneven and increasingly unequal transition to globalisation and the
emergence of a global order centred on an unprecedented level of US
supremacy. By some accounts the US bid for global mastery since the end of
the Cold War is the third such push since the USA emerged as a Great Power
in the final decades of the 19th century. The first was Woodrow Wilson’s
failed effort to turn the Treaty of Versailles after World War I into a
springboard for a new liberal international order, centred on the League of
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Nations (the latter part of this period saw the emergence of what we charac-
terise as late colonial nation building). The second was Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s more successful vision for a post-1945 world order, consolidated
via the United Nations and other international organisations (underpinned
by US political and economic dominance), and manifested in the anti-
communist liberalism and Cold War nation building of his successors until
the 1970s.12 The third push is reflected in the geopolitical and economic
changes of the 1970s that paved the way for the rise of neoliberalism in the
1980s, a process that was accelerated by the end of the Cold War and
the USA’s first major war with Iraq in 1990 – 91. However, we argue that
since 9/11 a more militarised form of neoliberal nation building has emerged,
which (ironically perhaps) is best characterised as neo-conservative nation
building.
From late colonial nation building to Cold War nation building
The consolidation of the idea of what we term late colonial nation building
was an outgrowth of important changes, particularly in British colonialism,
in the late colonial era in Asia and Africa.13 In the late colonial era the idea of
‘development’ was increasingly used by the British Colonial Office as a
framework for a series of policy interventions and metropolitan financial
initiatives that were aimed at improving living standards in the colonies and
regaining colonial legitimacy. A similar pattern, with a somewhat different
timeframe, was also apparent in the case of French colonialism.14 The
emergence of the idea of civilising the colonies as state-mediated national
development was also linked to greater regulation and control over the
economy as part of the war effort during World War II.15 Following the
Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, the British government used
this new conception of development to try and revitalise its colonial project in
Africa and parts of Asia at the very moment when it was under siege from
within and without.16 This eventually led to the establishment of the Colonial
Development Corporation in 1948.17 The British were also committed to
retaining imperial influence in the Middle East in the post-1945 era, but (and
this is an important ‘but’) did not necessarily see the Colonial Development
and Welfare Act as having much relevance to their relations with the
region.18 At the same time the ideas associated with late colonial nation
building still had an impact on the Middle East. The intrusive character of
this new found developmentalism (whether as part of the direct effort by
colonial officials or the more indirect result of war-time exigencies) resulted
in, or at least contributed to, increased conflict, thus producing the opposite
of what had been intended. In the late colonial era, as nationalists and trade
unionists in Asia, Africa and the Middle East appropriated the language and
concepts of state-mediated development and nation building, they escalated
their demands for better wages, social services and improved living standards
as well as political power and national sovereignty or independence.19 The
political ground which they were attempting to seize was made easier by the
emergence of the USA and USSR as the new global rivals following World
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War II, both of which publicly positioned themselves (at least rhetorically) as
staunchly anti-colonial.
It was increasingly clear that, in contrast to earlier efforts to justify
traditional empire, the post-1940 idea and practice of promoting economic
and political development within the colonies, and the Keynesian instruments
that went with it, had considerable appeal among nationalist elites in Asia,
Africa and the Middle East. However, it also became apparent that, by
attempting to use the idea of development to bolster their influence and
power, British colonial officials had helped to fatally undermine it as
decolonisation gained momentum. Late colonial nation building challenged
earlier colonial approaches that were centred on elite relationships between
the centre and periphery. In its late 19th and early 20th century form the
British Empire was primarily about the elaboration and maintenance of a
finely graded social hierarchy grounded in the semi-feudal and agrarian
vision of the British aristocracy. This vision sought to employ a complex
array of honours and pageants that would firmly link the British ruling elite
to the traditional chiefs and princes of Africa, Asia and the Middle East.20
However, with some exceptions (mainly in the Middle East and Oceania), it
was not a framework that could contain the young, often urbanised and
educated nationalists, particularly once late colonial nation building and
colonial development took hold after World War II. These local leaders
turned the centre’s view of colonial development into nation-building
projects that increasingly saw local power brokers take control over both
the newly established colonial development projects and the more long-
standing political machinery of the colonial or semi-colonial states in the
1950s and 1960s.21 Ultimately colonial development promoted by the
colonial officials undermined the long-standing claim of the home country
to be ‘bringing civilisation and order’ to savage peoples whose backwardness,
it was thought, was grounded in distinct cultures and/or immutable racial
shortcomings. The idea of development that emerged in the 1940s out of the
crisis of colonialism increasingly assumed that all colonial subjects could
operate as modern subjects.22 This was a central thread in the shift from a
global order of colonial empires to a world-wide system of nation-states.
Of particular significance here is the way in which Iraq emerged as an
independent nation-state under the auspices of British colonialism in the
period before the elaboration of colonial development and late colonial
nation building. The British-led nation-building efforts in the 1920s in Iraq
preceded the turn to colonial development and were thus driven by the more
traditional ideas of colonial officials who sought to gain and retain influence
through what they viewed as the traditional political and social structures of
the region. This is not to suggest that, had Iraq been an object of the more
fully articulated colonial development efforts by the British, it would have
emerged as a stable, modern, liberal nation-state, but simply that that
particular option was never even pursued. What is clear is that the history of
the creation of an independent Iraq under British colonial auspices between
1920 and 1932, and its subsequent trajectory as an independent nation-state
does not bode well for the current US neo-conservative nation-building effort
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since March 2003. This would be the case even if Washington were willing
and able to engage in a far more sustained and comprehensive struggle for
hearts and minds today than it ever did during its cold war nation-building
effort in South Vietnam 40 years ago.23
Since its establishment as a nation-state in the wake of the World War I,
and its subsequent entry into the League of Nations in 1932, Iraq has been
profoundly shaped by a number of major structural problems. First, the Iraqi
trajectory has been characterised for its entire history by the state’s use
(under the British, the Hashemite monarchs and then the Ba’athist regime) of
particularly high levels of organised violence. Second, there is a sustained
pattern of using the resources and patronage of the state to acquire the
support of key social groups. Third, the state has been able to use the
considerable revenue acquired from the oil industry to strengthen state
autonomy. Fourth, there has been an ongoing and pronounced pattern by
which the Iraqi state has recreated and exacerbated ostensibly ‘traditional’
ethnic, communal and sectarian demarcations as a distinct strategy to
maintain its ruling position. These dynamics reinforced the illegitimacy of the
Iraqi state for large sections of the population well before the start of the US
occupation.24
The emergence of Iraq, under British tutelage, out of the wreckage of the
Ottoman Empire after World War I reflected boundaries and institutional
arrangements that were primarily, if not exclusively, designed to serve British
geopolitical and imperial interests. Before World War I Britain and France
had exercised indirect forms of rule in the region, via support for and
intervention in the declining Ottoman Empire. The Paris Peace Conference in
January 1919 and the establishment of the League of Nations saw former
provinces of the Ottoman Empire turned over to Britain and France as
mandates. While France assumed control of Syria and Lebanon, Britain took
over Iraq and Palestine. They were all designated as ‘Class A’ mandates with
the expectation that independence would be granted in short order.25 It
should be emphasised that before the British mandate Iraq (formed in 1920
out of the three former Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul),
did not constitute a political community. No systems of government,
education, military command structure, or any of the institutions by which a
nation-state is defined and administered existed in the region, which the
British named formally as Mesopotamia. In addition, these erstwhile
Ottoman provinces were among the most ethnically and religiously diverse
Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire. Arabic speakers constituted 75 – 80%
of the population, Kurdish speakers 15 – 20%. Within the Arab population a
further division existed between the two sects of Islam: Shi’a and Sunni. The
population of the region of the late Ottoman empire that became Iraq was
therefore segmented into three distinct communities: the Arab Shi’a, the
Arab Sunni and the Kurds.26
Saddam Hussein’s lengthy period in power, from 1979 to 2003, is best seen
as a profound symptom of the historical dynamics of the Iraqi trajectory.27
Even in the Middle East, Iraq is distinctive. Both before and after Saddam
Hussein’s rise to the top of the country’s political structure, the Ba’athist
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regime has used a combination of extreme forms of violence and the
distribution of oil-based patronage to eliminate or domesticate any signi-
ficant autonomous political activity. In this context the US-led coalition is
often latching onto political elements that appear to be autonomous and
authentic, or it may even embrace ‘primordialisation’, as did the British
colonial rulers of the 1920s in the period before the more full articulation of
colonial development and late colonial nation building. ‘Primordialism’, as
used here, involves assuming that Iraqi society is still dominated by pre-
modern tribal and religious structures. Today there are clear indications that
both the USA and its British allies are using these ostensibly pre-modern
structures. However, they need to be seen not as traditional institutions or
practices with roots deep in the region’s history, but as social structures
destroyed and then reconstructed under the British mandate, and then again
reorganised and reconstituted as pillars of the regime of Saddam Hussein.28
London’s failed effort early in the 20th century to construct a liberal nation-
state out of three former Ottoman provinces, and its creation of a neo-
traditional order overlaid by the veneer of a modern nation-state, continues
to be central to any understanding of post-Saddam Iraq in the early 21st
century. And Washington’s inability, or unwillingness, to understand this
means that it has already embarked on a neo-conservative version of the
failed nation-building effort presided over by the British in Iraq in the late
colonial era.29
From Cold War nation building to neoliberal nation building
The USA played a key role in the consolidation of the nation-state system
after 1945, with the USSR emerging as its only significant rival. During the
Cold War both the position of the USA in the nation-state system and the
foreign policies and practices of the USSR still bore significant traces of
earlier forms of colonialism and imperialism. It should be emphasised,
however, that the cold war ‘empires’ of both the USA and the USSR
departed in important ways from earlier colonial or imperial projects. Most
significantly, in political and administrative terms, both the USA and the
USSR presided over empires that were made up more-or-less entirely of
formally independent and sovereign nation-states, rather than colonies. In
the cold war era the relationship between the respective superpowers and
their allies was increasingly mediated by systems of military alliances (NATO
and the Warsaw Pact), regional organisations (the OAS and Comecon), and
new international institutions such as the United Nations. In particular the
post-1945 settlement sought to ‘reconcile openness’ with the Keynesian
orientation of national leaders to ensure national and international economic
stability and full employment.30 With the onset of the Cold War in the late
1940s the USA was increasingly animated by a commitment to construct an
open world economy, while promoting state-mediated national development,
or what can be termed cold war nation building, as part of its wider effort
to contain the USSR and its allies. The protection of private property
and the interests of capital were an essential part of the wider fabric of the
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anti-communist internationalism which increasingly informed US foreign
policy.31 But this was combined with a commitment to an array of social and
economically interventionist policies and practices that gave considerable
weight to the role of the public sector and the state rather than the market.
For example, the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, formally announced
on 12 March 1947 by President Harry S Truman (1944 – 52), represented an
important turning point in the onset of the Cold War and in the emergence of
cold war nation-building. The Truman Doctrine was a response to the
growing influence of communist parties in Greece and Turkey and included
the extension, after approval by the US Congress on 15 May 1947 of US$400
million in economic and military aid to the Greek and Turkish governments.
This was followed on 5 June 1947 by Secretary of State George C Marshall’s
famous speech announcing what would become the Marshall Plan for
Western Europe.32
On 3 April 1948 Truman signed the Economic Cooperation Act (Marshall
Plan) creating the Economic Cooperation Administration, an initiative that
represented an important precedent for subsequent US aid to Asia, Africa,
the Middle East and Latin America. In fact Japan, South Korea and Saudi
Arabia also received aid under the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was
aimed at preventing any further worsening of the post-1945 economic and
political crisis in post-1945 Europe. In particular it was aimed at preventing
or containing the emergence in Europe of governments, or groupings of
governments, that would threaten the geopolitical and security interests of
the USA. It involved the disbursement of $12.5 billion towards the
reconstruction of Western Europe over a four-year period. Although it was
initially offered to the USSR and Eastern Europe, Moscow and its client
regimes found the conditions that went with it unacceptable and rejected the
Plan. By the early 1950s the Marshall Plan was a key factor in increasing
Western European industrial production to 35% and agricultural production
to 18% above the levels they had reached before World War II. The Marshall
Plan also drew attention to the benefits of foreign aid for the US economy.
One of the requirements of the Marshall Plan had been that the bulk of the
aid money had to be used to purchase US exports; this provided an
important stimulus to the US economy, while bolstering trade linkages that
favoured US manufacturers.33 At the end of the 1940s the USA had
embarked on a full-scale programme of industrial reconstruction and
national redevelopment in Western Europe. It had also launched a related
effort in Northeast Asia, as part of an attempt to turn Japan and key nation-
states, such as South Korea and Taiwan, into capitalist bulwarks against the
USSR and the People’s Republic of China.34
One of the defining characteristics of Cold War nation building was, thus,
the emphasis on new international institutions. These institutions were
central to the generation of an international framework that would promote
capitalist nation building in the cold war era. The IMF, for example, sought to
curtail foreign exchange difficulties. The International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (the World Bank) dispensed public loans to encourage
private foreign investment around the world. Both had been established on
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27 December 1945 following a high-level meeting in Bretton Woods, NH in
1944. With the start of the Cold War the Bretton Woods institutions (which
were ostensibly part of the UN, but in practice operated beyond UN control)
became central to US international economic predominance and the
international framework for cold war nation building, such as the flow of
capital and commodities. While the World Bank and the IMF had been
established with a view to the post-war reconstruction of Western Europe, by
the 1950s they had clearly expanded their activities to include the encour-
agement and facilitation of cold war nation building and anti-communist
stability in Asia and elsewhere.35 In 1952 Chile, which became an important
cold war battleground in the 1960s and 1970s, was the first nation-state
outside Western Europe to receive a World Bank loan.36
Also of significance in creating an institution-driven international frame-
work for cold war nation building was the network of regional development
banks, such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). The administration of President Dwight D
Eisenhower (1953 – 60) established the IDB in 1959. There is also a range of
development-related organisations that grew up around the UN. While the
UN Security Council’s focus was on issues of peace and war, the General
Assembly was given particular responsibility from the outset for social and
economic issues. Over the years, as this brief grew, an array of, often semi-
autonomous, specialised agencies (besides the aforementioned IMF and
World Bank) emerged. For example, the International Labor Organisation
(ILO), which had been set up by the League of Nations, was revitalised. The
UN also established the World Health Organisation (WHO), the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), not to mention the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Expanded Programme of
Technical Assistance.37
These initiatives followed on from President Truman’s Point IV
programme. On 20 January 1949 Truman delivered his inaugural address
at the start of his second term as president, during which he sketched out an
expanded foreign aid policy in the fourth and final point of the address. Point
I pledged continuing US support for the United Nations. Point II emphasised
US support for world economic recovery, while Point III reiterated the US
commitment to supporting ‘freedom loving nations’. Point IV set out a US
commitment to providing technical and scientific expertise, and capital, to
‘underdeveloped’ nations in an effort to improve their living standards. Point
IV led to the Act for International Development in June 1950 that allowed
for the creation of a Technical Cooperation Administration. The programme
started with a budget of $45 million. In 1953 the US Congress increased the
budget of the Point IV programme to $155 million. With the outbreak of the
Korean War, Washington also sought, via the establishment of the Mutual
Security Agency on 31 October 1951, to directly link economic programmes
and technical assistance to military initiatives. Then the passage of Public
Law 480 (PL 480) on 10 July 1954 provided the authority for surplus food in
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the USA to be purchased by Washington and used for economic develop-
ment purposes.38
The contours of an international framework for cold war nation building
were taking shape by the late 1940s and 1950s. It was, however, during the
administrations of John F Kennedy (1961 – 63) and his immediate successor,
Lyndon B Johnson (1963 – 68), that cold war nation building reached its
apex.39 For example, following the Cuban revolution in 1959 there was a
dramatic increase in US interest in Latin America in the context of a growing
concern in the USA that the USSR was gaining ground in the Third World.40
The Kennedy administration placed considerable emphasis on the need for a
more ambitious cold war nation building and counterinsurgency strategy to
take the initiative in Asia and Latin America, as well as in the Middle East
and Africa. It sought to counter the communist threat via the infusion of
increased levels of military and economic aid, advice and support. As part of
its wider emphasis on foreign aid and national development the Kennedy
administration formed the Peace Corps on 1 March 1961 and then set up the
US Agency for International Development (USAID) in November 1961 to co-
ordinate and combine government foreign aid initiatives. Established as a
semi-autonomous body operating in the State Department, USAID was
responsible for disbursing and administering aid around the world. Apart
from South Vietnam, which was emerging as a major focus of aid, a large
percentage of the aid this new body disbursed went initially to the Alliance
for Progress. This had been set up following a famous speech by Kennedy on
13 March 1961 in which he called for all the people and governments of the
Western Hemisphere to participate in an ambitious modernising initiative
that he hoped would transform Latin America in a decade. By doing so
Kennedy sought to contain the communist threat to the region represented
by the emergence of state socialism in Cuba.41 Although its goals were
never realised, the Alliance for Progress laid out a 10-year plan to increase
economic growth rates, introduce land reform, increase literacy, diversify
national economies and build public infrastructure, including schools,
housing, roads and hospitals across the region. In the 1960s, then, the
promotion of cold war nation building in Latin America, South Vietnam and
beyond was grounded in state involvement in the market. All this
increasingly exceeded the administrative and financial capacity of a majority
of nation-states. The results by the 1970s were increasing levels of foreign
debt, bloated and ineffective bureaucracies presided over by corrupt elites
and rising levels of social and political instability.42
From neoliberal nation building to neo-conservative nation building
The universalisation of the nation-state system and the deepening crisis of
cold war nation building coincided with the rise of neoliberalism and the
beginnings of what can be called neoliberal nation building against the
backdrop of the US-led globalisation project.43 With this shift and the end of
the Cold War in the 1990s, the deepening of global capitalism has been even
more geographically uneven than in the 1950s and 1960s. During the latter
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period cold war nation building was, at least in theory, more attuned to
questions of redistribution and the need to address the uneven development
that took place within nation-states and between them. The rise of
neoliberalism has involved the coalescence of regionalised economic systems
that provide the main motors of the global economy.44 These regions are
North America, Western Europe and East Asia. Instead of the international
economy expanding in spatial terms, since the 1970s the various financial,
trading and production networks that connect these powerful economic
regions have been getting deeper and stronger. The process of regional
exclusion, however, does not simply involve the economic neglect of a
particular region or economies. It also entails the increasing elaboration of
humanitarian networks and activities by the UN and a range of aid
organisations. There are also important peace-keeping and nation-building
initiatives by outside governments in the marginalised regions, sometimes
under UN auspices and at other times operating under the authority of a
particular national government or group of national governments, or of a
regional organisation.45
In the post-9/11 world the UN and its peace-keeping efforts are no doubt a
significant, albeit profoundly constrained, component in a wider post-cold
war order centred on the USA (a USA that currently has limited respect for
the UN). This is a post-cold war order in which instability, terrorism and
criminality in the marginalised regions and failing nation-states in various
parts of the world have precipitated the emergence of a renewed emphasis on
the connection between security and development. Whereas the Cold War
witnessed the active engagement and promotion of international institutions
as the primary locus of development, neoliberal nation building sought an
expanded toolkit of more flexible options. This shift is embodied in the
growing links between strategies of conflict resolution, social reconstruction
and foreign aid policies. While the USA and other Organisation of Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) governments have been engaged in
the post-cold war nation building effort that this reorientation represents, this
task is also being shifted to new or reconfigured networks that combine
national governments, military establishments, myriad private companies
and contractors and NGOs.46 This renewed awareness of the links between
security and development is reminiscent of, though not the same as, the anti-
communist nation-building strategies that rose and fell during the Cold War.
The chances of success of the new, more privatised, more decentralised and
highly militarised approach to nation building (even where a single
government, such as that of the USA, takes on a pivotal role, as in Iraq)
are slimmer than they were in the decades immediately after 1945.
In retrospect it is clear that nation building in all its forms, be it late
colonial, cold war or neoliberal, is a projection (or distorted expression) into
the international arena of key domestic political dynamics that are taking
place in the metropolis. In the case of the USA the rise of the neo-
conservatives in US domestic politics confirms this trend, and has played a
critical role in the conduct of the Bush administration’s wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq. As a political movement, the neo-conservatives are a hybrid of both
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traditional liberal and conservative thought. Unlike both liberals and
conservatives, however, neo-conservatives are more interested in foreign
policy than domestic concerns. Like liberals, neo-conservatives believe that
humans are all basically the same good creatures at heart and that bad
government is the primary source of humanity’s ills. As a result, American
neo-conservatives (and their liberal counterparts) essentially embrace the
ideas set forth in the much-debated theory of the ‘democratic peace’.47 This
theory postulates a simple axiom: democracies don’t fight each other. As a
result, the active promotion of democracy should be a key component of US
foreign policy. Where the neo-conservative policy makers separate them-
selves from liberals is in the means of achieving change within bad (non-
democratic) governments. Liberals have traditionally viewed international
institutions, and the incremental spread of international law, as key to
solving the critical issues of international order, achieving peace and stability,
and spreading democracy in an evolutionary approach. By contrast neo-
conservatives view multilateralism (and international institutions) as having
been an abject failure in their efforts to achieve peace and stability. For neo-
conservatives the long-term survival of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq,
and its endless flaunting of UN sanctions, was one of the most illustrative
examples of this failure. In short, neo-conservatives basically agree with
liberals that all people deserve good government, but they disagree with
liberals in the efficacy of international institutions and negotiations to achieve
political change. Neo-conservatives support rapid and decisive change that
can only be brought about by military force. In this regard neo-conservatives
differ from traditional conservatives, who believe in the utility of military
force to influence state behaviour, but who are much less sanguine about the
military’s ability to transform autocracies into democracies.
The global context after 9/11 was ripe for neo-conservative policy makers
to push a unilateralist agenda for ‘regime change’ in Iraq. President Bush
foreshadowed the new approach in his address to Congress on 6 November
2001, in which he informed the world community: ‘You are either with us or
against us’.48 Among other things, this revealed a crucial aspect of how neo-
conservative thinking is different from that of both conservatives and liberals.
American neo-conservatives are committed to the idea that the USA rep-
resents the finest and purest form of government and society on the planet.
What set neo-conservatives serving in the Bush administration at the
beginning of the war in Iraq apart from their liberal and conservative
counterparts was the fundamental belief that hiding inside every Iraqi was an
American waiting to jump out. As such, all that ‘regime change’ really boiled
down to for neo-conservatives was breaking the Ba’athist apparatus,
capturing or killing Saddam and his henchmen, and letting a mass-inspired
‘good government’ of loyal Iraqis spontaneously emerge from the ostensibly
minimal wreckage of the US military’s ‘shock and awe’ campaign. These
newly liberated Iraqis would peacefully rule themselves as US troops rapidly
withdrew, and Iraqi officials would co-ordinate with the State Department on
what they needed to rebuild the country. As a result of neo-conservative
civilian oversight in the Pentagon, the US military leaders were encouraged
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to build a campaign that was focused on destroying Saddam’s governing
infrastructure, but were instructed essentially not worry about nation
building afterwards. Iraq had plenty of oil wealth to pay for its own
rebuilding, and Iraqis’ natural democratic tendencies and shared vision of a
unified national state would ensure co-operation among its sub-national
components.49 It was a shockingly inaccurate analysis of the situation.
The overall neo-conservative character of US-led nation-building in Iraq
and the profound limits on its success were first manifested clearly in the way
that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) set about the reordering of
Iraqi society in 2003. Paul Bremer, the first head of the CPA, approached his
job based on the assumption that the unassailable superiority of the market
was the key to the reformation of the Iraqi state. Furthermore, this could be
combined with the presence of a US-led military establishment to rebuild
Iraq as a kind of blank slate for the realisation of the neo-conservative vision
of the new ‘global democratic revolution’. At the start the US neo-
conservative nation-building effort in Iraq suffered from what has recently
been described as the ‘nirvana fallacy’: that is, it was grounded in hopelessly
exaggerated expectations of the importance and effectiveness of outside
intervention generally and of US intervention more specifically.50 Following
the takeover of Iraqi institutions, or what was left of them after the wholesale
dismissal of Ba’ath party officials and the Iraqi army, and the uneven
imposition of order, the main task was seen to be the radical reform of the
state. In particular this focused on the winding back of its control of the
economy, at the same time as the CPA sought to retain the state’s role in
maintaining social order. However, the neo-conservative vision of a peaceful,
unified, pro-American Iraq smashed into a society that was deeply divided
and embraced no shared sense of what it meant to be an ‘Iraqi’.
By 2004 neo-conservative nation building was terminally ill, if not already
dead. In this context US-led occupation forces found themselves increasingly
turning to the ‘primordialism’ that had been a key factor in earlier British
colonial state building in Iraq and had also become increasingly central to
Saddam Hussein’s rule. From this perspective, while Iraq’s overall territorial
boundaries were still accepted as natural and legitimate, Iraq was recognised
as consisting of three homogeneous communities (Sunni, Shia and Kurd)
whose interests were in direct opposition to each other, and often at odds
with US interests. The acceptance of this tripartite ethnic – religious division
underpinned the way in which the Interim Iraqi Council was organised. It
also increasingly grounded the way in which the US occupation force, like
Saddam before it, sought to establish and maintain control via the use of
what were perceived as traditional tribal leaders and structures. The
combination of neo-conservative visions of US-style global democracy and
the neo-traditionalism of primordialism underpinned the twists and turns
taken by the USA following the invasion. This combination, and the wider
historical context and contemporary crisis of the nation-state system, are the
key to Washington’s failed exercise in nation building in Iraq.51 At the heart
of the US approach to Iraq now is not an effort to create a stable political
order, but one to put into place a sufficiently effective military establishment
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that will allow for the withdrawal of US troops and the maintenance of US
influence. While this may be central to Washington’s overall plan for Iraq,
the evidence thus far of anything resembling an effective Iraqi army is hard to
find.52 Apparently, if judged in terms of a unified national identity, Iraq is a
country with very few Iraqis. At the same time, there is no shortage of
technocratic and strategic advice on how to create effective Iraqi military and
police establishments.53 What this commentary and strategic analysis
overlooks is the particular history and geopolitical economy that led to the
current situation in Iraq. It also overlooks the more particular way in which
the Bush administration has dealt with, or failed to deal with, the
deteriorating situation in Iraq since the president famously and prematurely
declared ‘Mission accomplished’ in 2003. More broadly the US-led neo-
conservative state-building effort in Iraq is being mismanaged against the
backdrop of a post-cold war global order in which the number of collapsed
and collapsing nation-states is increasing as globalisation transforms the
nation-state system and pushes a growing number of nation-states to their
limits and beyond. Washington’s preoccupation with democracy as the sine
qua non for achieving security (a neo-conservative rather than a neoliberal
project) instead of internationalism and development has not so much
weakened the push to globalisation as militarised it, carrying us from
neoliberal nation building to neo-conservative nation building and beyond.
However, as we have tried to emphasise, the growing preoccupation with
nation building and counterinsurgency in the post-cold war and post-9/11 era
has limited (and in some cases precluded) prospects for success, if those
involved in the process fail to locate what they are doing in a critical
historical context. At a bare minimum there is a need to actually link the
formulation and implementation of contemporary nation building and
counterinsurgency strategies to the history of the 20th century generally
and to a critical examination of the history, theory and practice of insurgency
and counterinsurgency more specifically.
There is, of course, a relatively substantial literature on the history and
dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency (revolution and counter-
revolution) and/or ‘irregular warfare’.54 While insurgency and counter-
insurgency have a long and complex lineage, modern guerrilla warfare (and
the term ‘guerrilla’ itself) emerged as part of the growing challenge to
monarchical legitimacy and power in the second half of the 18th century.
Despite the long history of insurgency and counterinsurgency, it can be
argued that this is still a marginal topic in academic circles and a deeply
neglected topic within military education circles. The Department of Defense
Analysis (DA), which was established at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, CA in the early post-cold war era, is a notable exception. This, at
least in part, explains the fact that many of the contributors to this volume
are based there. The DA was founded by Dr Gordon McCormick under
Department of Defense sponsorship to provide graduate training to US
Army Special Forces officers, but now draws students from all branches of
the US military and also attracts a growing number of international students.
The emergence and growth of the DA as home to a critical mass of
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interdisciplinary scholarship focusing on insurgency and counterinsurgency
has been driven by expertise in the disciplines of political science, anthro-
pology, mathematics, computer science, theology, history and sociology.
Its very existence reflects an increasing awareness by those elements of the
US Defense establishment responsible for counter-terrorism and special
operations of the need to come to grips with the politics and the cultural
and socioeconomic elements of insurgency, counterinsurgency and nation
building.
Conclusion: insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states
The contributors to this volume, on what is now being described by the
Pentagon and the White House as the ‘Long War’, approach the question of
insurgency and counterinsurgency in an era of collapsing states from a
variety of perspectives. However, they all examine contemporary insurgen-
cies, counterinsurgencies and/or nation building efforts in various parts of the
world from a critical and/or comparative perspective. This attempts to shed
new light on the complex reasons for success and failure and also to clarify
and evaluate the limits of the ‘Long War’ now being pursued by the USA and
its allies. Ultimately this volume brings together a very wide range of views in
order to advance the debate around key aspects of the history and future of
the Long War generally, and the question of insurgency, counterinsurgency
and collapsing states more specifically.
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